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Abstract.  Suppose that several individuals who have separately assessed prior probability distributions over a set of possible states of the world wish to pool their individual distributions into a single group distribution, while taking into account jointly perceived new evidence. They have the option of (i) first updating their individual priors and then pooling the resulting posteriors or (ii) first pooling their priors and then updating the resulting group prior. If the pooling method that they employ is such that they arrive at the same final distribution in both cases, the method is said to be externally Bayesian, a property first studied by Madansky (1964). We show that a pooling method for discrete distributions is externally Bayesian if and only if it commutes with Jeffrey conditioning, parameterized in terms of certain ratios of new to old odds, as in Wagner (2002), rather than in terms of the posterior probabilities of members of the disjoint family of events on which such conditioning originates.
	

1.  Combining Probability Distributions.

In what follows, Ω denotes a countable set of possible states of the world, assumed to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive. A function
p: Ω → [0,1]  is a probability mass function (pmf)  iff   ∑ωΩ p(ω) = 1.
The support of a pmf p is the set  Supp(p) : = { ω : p(ω) > 0 }.
Each pmf p gives rise to a probability measure (which, abusing notation, we also denote by p) defined for each set  E  Ω  by
p(E) := ∑ωE p(ω).

   Denote by  Δ  the set of all pmfs on Ω, and let n be a positive integer. Let  Δn   denote the n-fold Cartesian product of  Δ , with 

               Δn+ : = {  (p1,…,pn)  Δn :   ∩i Supp(pi) ≠   } .
	
A  pooling operator  is any function T: Δn+ → Δ .1  Given                             (p1,…,pn)  Δn+ , the pmf  T(p1,…,pn) may, depending on the context, represent

(i)  a rough summary of the current pmfs  p1,…,pn  of  n individuals;

(ii)  a compromise adopted by these individuals in order to complete an exercise in group decision making;

(iii)  a “rational” consensus to which all individuals have revised their initial pmfs  p1,…,pn  after extensive discussion;

(iv)  the pmf of a decision maker external to a group of n experts (who may or may not have assessed his own prior over Ω before consulting the group) upon being apprised of the pmfs  p1,…,pn  of these experts;

(v)  a revision of the pmf pi of a particular individual i upon being apprised of the pmfs of individuals 1,…,i-1,i+1,…,n, each of whom he may or may not consider to be his “epistemic peer.” 

   The appropriate restrictions to place on the pooling operator T will naturally depend on the interpretation of T(p1,…,pn). For example, it might seem reasonable for T to preserve unanimity (T(p,…,p) = p) 2
in cases (i),(ii), and (v) above, but perhaps not in cases (iii) and (iv). There is an extensive literature on this general subject (see, for example, the article of Genest and Zidek (1986) for a summary and appraisal of work done through the mid-1980s). There has also been a recent surge of interest in problems associated with interpretation (v) above, as part of a field of inquiry that has come to be termed the “epistemology of disagreement.”

   Our interest here is not in adjudicating which restrictions on pooling are appropriate in which situations, but rather in a formal analysis of one proposed group rationality condition, known as external Bayesianity, and its connections with Jeffrey conditioning.(We employ in what follows the language of interpretations (ii) and (iii) above, since it is in those cases where external Bayesianity seems most compelling.  But our formal results apply to the other interpretations as well, for whatever interest that may have.) We shall see that a pooling operator for pmfs is externally Bayesian if and only if it commutes with Jeffrey conditioning, parameterized in terms of certain ratios of new to old odds, as in Wagner (2002), rather than in terms of the posterior probabilities of members of the disjoint family of events on which such conditioning originates.

2.  Externally Bayesian Pooling Operators.

Consider the situation in which n individuals who have assessed pmfs  p1,…,pn    over  Ω  subsequently undergo  identical new learning as a result of jointly perceived new evidence. Should they first update their individual priors based on the jointly perceived new information, and then pool the posteriors? Or should they pool their priors, and then update the result of pooling based on this information?  

   Take the simplest case, where each individual comes to learn that the true state of the world belongs to the subset E of Ω, but nothing that would change the odds between any states ω1 and ω2 in E.  It would thus be appropriate for each individual i to revise his pi to, let us call it qi, by conditioning on E,3  so that for each ω  Ω,

(2.1)       qi(ω) = pi(ω|E) : = pi(ω) [ω  E] / pi(E),

where [‌ω  E] denotes the characteristic function4 of the set  E,  evaluated at ω . These revised pmfs might then be combined by means of the pooling operator T.  Alternatively, one might imagine first pooling the priors p1,…,pn  and then conditioning the result on E.  If either of these procedures results in the same final distribution, we say that T commutes with conditioning (CC). This property may be expressed formally as follows:

CC :  For all subsets E of Ω and all  (p1,…,pn)  Δn+  such that pi(E) > 0,  i= 1,…,n,  and  (p1(.|E),…,pn(.|E))    Δn+ , it is the case that

(2.2)                    T(p1,…,pn)(E)  > 0  ,

and                    

(2.3)              T(p1(.|E),…,pn(.|E))  =  T(p1,…,pn)(.|E).  

   Condition CC is a special case of a more general property of pooling operators called external Bayesianity, first introduced by Madansky (1964,1978), and elaborated upon by Genest, McConway, and Schervish (1986). Given  (p1,…,pn) Δn+, we say that a function           λ : Ω → [0, ∞)  is a  likelihood  for (p1,…,pn)  if

(2.4)            0 <   ∑ωΩ λ(ω) pi(ω)  < ∞  , i= 1,…,n,

and  (q1,…,qn)  Δn+ ,  where

(2.5)           qi(ω) : =   λ(ω)pi(ω) / ∑ωΩ λ(ω) pi(ω) .

For concreteness, it may be useful to think of the special case of the above in which the domain of the pmfs pi is extended to include the event obs, with qi(ω) = pi(ω|obs), and λ(ω) denoting the common value of the likelihoods  pi(obs|ω).5 Then (2.5) is simply Bayes’ formula, and models the revision of the priors p1,…,pn in a situation where individuals disagree about the probabilities of various possible states of the world, while agreeing about the probability of experiencing obs in each of those states.6
 
A pooling operator T :   Δn+ → Δ  is externally Bayesian (EB)  iff the following condition is satisfied:

EB :  If  (p1,…,pn)   Δn+  and  λ  is a likelihood for (p1,…,pn), then

(2.6)                       0 < ∑ωΩ λ(ω) T(p1,…,pn)(ω) < ∞,

and the following commutativity property holds:

(2.7)    T( λp1 / ∑ωΩ λ(ω) p1(ω), … , λpn / ∑ωΩ λ(ω) pn(ω))

            = λ T(p1,…,pn) / ∑ωΩ λ(ω) T(p1,…,pn)(ω).  7

   Implicit in the definition of external Bayesianity is the following view of the proper way to represent identical new learning:  Recall that if  q  is a revision of the probability measure  p  and  A  and  B  are events, the Bayes factor  β(q,p ; A : B) is the ratio

(2.8)               β(q,p ; A:B)  := (q(A)/q(B)) / (p(A)/p(B))

of new to old odds, and the  relevance quotient  ρ(q,p ; A)  is the ratio

(2.9)               ρ(q,p ; A)  := q(A)/p(A)

of new to old probabilities.  When q = p(.|E), then (2.8) is simply the likelihood ratio  p(E|A)/p(E|B).  More generally,

(2.10)               β(q,p ; A : B) = ρ(q,p ; A) / ρ(q,p ; B) ,

a simple, but useful, identity.  Suppose that the probability distributions 
(q1,…,qn) are related by formula (2.5) to the distributions (p1,…,pn).  Then, for all i, and for all ω and ω* in Ω, it is easy to verify that

(2.11)              β(qi,pi ; ω : ω*) = λ(ω)/ λ(ω*), 8

i.e., for each fixed pair of states in Ω, the ratios of new to old odds are uniform over i = 1,…,n. Similarly, denoting  T(p1,…,pn)  by  p  and         λ T(p1,…,pn) / ∑ωΩ λ(ω) T(p1,…,pn)(ω)  by  r , we have 

(2.12)              β(r,p ; ω : ω*) = λ(ω)/ λ(ω*).

In other words, implicit in the definition of external Bayesianity is the view that, identical new learning should be reflected in identical Bayes factors at the level of atomic events. This is an important point, to which we shall have occasion to return in Section 3.

     Remark 2.1. Setting   λ(ω) = [ω  E]  shows, as suggested above, that EB implies CC.

    Remark 2.2. The term externally Bayesian derives from the fact that a group of decision makers having a common utility function but different priors over the relevant states of nature and employing an EB pooling operator will make decisions that appear to an outsider like the decisions of a single Bayesian decision maker (see Madansky 1964). An example due to Raiffa (1968, pp. 221-6) shows that the use of pooling operators that fail to satisfy EB may lead members of the group to act in strange ways.

   The set of externally Bayesian pooling operators is clearly nonempty since “dictatorial” pooling (for fixed d, T(p1,…,pn) = pd for all       (p1,…,pn)  Δn+)  satisfies EB.  Note, however, that weighted arithmetic means, i.e., pooling operators T defined by

(2.13)              T(p1,…,pn) := ∑1≤ i ≤n w(i)pi(ω),

where  w(1), … ,w(n)  is a sequence of nonnegative real numbers summing to one, fail in general to satisfy EB. On the other hand, suppose that we define a pooling operator  T  by

(2.14)    T(p1,…,pn)(ω) := Π1≤ i ≤n pi(ω)w(i) / ∑ωΩ Π1≤ i ≤n pi(ω)w(i) , 9

where 00 : = 1. It is easy to verify that such normalized weighted geometric means, which have come to be termed logarithmic pooling operators, are externally Bayesian, a fact first noted (according to Bacharach (1972)) by Peter Hammond. A complete characterization of externally Bayesian pooling operators appears in Genest, McConway, and Schervish (1986).


3.  Jeffrey Conditioning and External Bayesianity.  

Let Ω be a set of possible states of the world (with no cardinality restrictions for the moment) and let A be a σ-algebra of subsets (“events”) of Ω. Let p and q be probability measures on A, and let        E = {Ek} be a countable set of nonempty, pairwise disjoint events such that p(Ek) > 0  for all k. We say that q comes from p by Jeffrey conditioning (JC) on E  if there exists a sequence (ek) of positive real numbers summing to one such that, for every A in A,

(3.1)                        q(A) = ∑k ek p(A|Ek). 10

Formula (3.1) is the appropriate way to update your prior p in light of new evidence if and only if  (1) based on the total evidence, old as well as new, you judge that for each k, the posterior probability  q(Ek) should take the value ek ; and  (2) for each  Ek, and for all A in A, you judge that q(A|Ek) = p(A|Ek).11 Conditions (1) and (2) amount to the assertion that you have learned something new about the events Ek, but nothing new about their relevance to any other events. Of course, when E = {E},  JC reduces to ordinary conditioning.

     In the special case where Ω is countable and A = 2Ω, formula (3.1) is equivalent to

(3.2)    q(ω) = ∑k ek p(ω|Ek) =  ∑k ek p(ω) [ω  Ek] / p(Ek),   for all ωΩ,

and condition (2) is equivalent to the judgment that, for all k, nothing in the new evidence should disturb the odds between any two states of the world in Ek.12   Note also that if  p  and  q  are any pmfs on the countable set  Ω  and  Supp(q)  Supp(p), then  q  comes from  p  by JC on the family  E = { {ω} :  q(ω) > 0 }. 

    Does every externally Bayesian pooling operator commute with Jeffrey, as well as ordinary, conditioning?  Consider the following simple example, where Ω = { ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4 },   E1 = { ω1, ω2 },               E2 = { ω3, ω4 },  E = { E1, E2 },  and  e1 = e2 = ½ :

                                     TABLE 3.1

           ω1     ω2      ω3     ω4                           ω1     ω2      ω3     ω4

p1 :      1/7    4/7     1/7    1/7        POOL
                                                     →        p :  1/4     1/4     1/4    1/4
p2 :    4/13   1/13   4/13  1/13
                                                                                   ↓   J C
                                                                 
                      ↓    J C                                  r :  1/4     1/4     1/4    1/4


q1 :    1/10    2/5    1/4     1/4        POOL
                                                     →        q :  2/9     2/9    5/18   5/18
q2  :    2/5    1/10   1/4     1/4


     In the above revision schema, qi comes from pi by JC on the partition E, with qi(E1) = qi(E2) = ½, i = 1, 2, and r comes from p by JC on E, with r(E1) = r(E2) = ½.  The distribution p results from the externally Bayesian pooling of p1 and p2 by normalized geometric averaging (i.e., by formula (2.14) above, with n =2 and w(1) =         w(2) = ½), and the distribution q results from the same pooling formula, applied to q1 and q2. Since q ≠ r, we apparently have here a case where updating by JC does not commute with externally Bayesian pooling. But this is neither surprising nor disturbing. For the Jeffrey revisions of p1 to q1, of p2 to q2, and of p to r, parameterized as in formula (3.2), are not instances of updating by a single likelihood λ.  Contrary to (2.11) and (2.12), we have, for example,  β(q1,p1 ; ω1 : ω3) = 2/5, β(q2,p2 ; ω1 : ω3) = 8/5, and β(r,p ; ω1 : ω3) = 1.  On the conception of identical new learning implicit in the definition of external Bayesianity, agents 1 and 2 are not revising their priors p1 and p2 based on identical new learning. And their fictional group surrogate is revising the result, r, of pooling p1 and p2 in response to still different new learning. In short, in the context of updating by Jeffrey conditioning, identical new learning is not expressed by identical posterior probabilities of the events Ek. 

      What is the proper representation of identical new learning in this context? We have already observed that it is implicit in the definition of external Bayesianity that identical new learning should be reflected in identical Bayes factors at the level of atomic events. When updating by JC, however, there is an equivalent, coarser-grained version of this identity, based on the following special case of a theorem in Wagner (2003, Theorem 3.1):

Theorem 3.1.  Given a countable set Ω, let p, q, P, and Q  be probability measures on A = 2Ω, with q regarded as a revision of p, and Q a revision of P. If q comes from p by Jeffrey conditioning on the family E, then

(3.3)        β(Q,P ; ω : ω*) = β(q,p ; ω : ω*)     for all ω, ω*  Ω

if and only if  Q comes from P by Jeffrey conditioning on E  and

(3.4)        β(Q,P ; Ei : Ej) = β(q,p ; Ei : Ej)   for all Ei ,Ej  E.

This suggests that, for our present purposes, the proper parameterization of Jeffrey conditioning should involve Bayes factors associated with pairs of events in E. Such a parameterization, which first appears in Wagner (2002)13, is easily derived from formula (3.2).

 Theorem 3.2.  Suppose that q comes from p by Jeffrey conditioning on the family E = {Ek} and let  bk : = β(q,p ; Ek : E1) ,  k = 1,2,… . Then, for all ω in Ω, 

(3.5)            q(ω ) =  ∑k bk p(ω) [ω  Ek]  /  ∑k bk p(Ek) .14

Proof.  Dividing  (3.2) by  1 = q(Ω) = ∑k  p(Ek) q(Ek)/p(Ek), replacing ek
by q(Ek),  dividing the numerator and denominator of the resulting fraction by q(E1)/ p(E1), and invoking (2.10) yields (3.5).     □

The above parameterization of JC allows us to formulate a commutativity property with the proper relation to external Bayesianity.  We say that a pooling operator T commutes with JC, so parameterized, (CJC) if and only if the following condition holds:

CJC :  For all families E = {Ek} of nonempty, pairwise disjoint subsets
of Ω, all  (p1,…,pn)  Δn+   such that pi(Ek) > 0  for all i and all k, and all sequences (bk) of positive real numbers such that b1 = 1  and

(3.6)        ∑k bk pi(Ek) < ∞  , i= 1,…,n,  

and such that (q1,…,qn)  Δn+ , where

(3.7)       qi(ω) : = ∑k bk pi(ω)[ ωEk]  /  ∑k bk pi(Ek) , 

it is the case that





(3.9)  T(∑k bk p1[ .Ek] / ∑k bk p1(Ek), … , ∑k bk pn[ .Ek] / ∑k bk pn(Ek))

          =  ∑k bk T(p1,…, pn) [ .Ek]  /  ∑k bk T(p1,…, pn) (Ek) .  


Theorem 3.3.  A pooling operator T:  Δn+ → Δ  is externally Bayesian if and only if it commutes with Jeffrey conditioning in the sense of CJC .

Proof.  Necessity. Let T be externally Bayesian. Suppose that (3.6) holds and that (q1,…,qn)  Δn+, where qi is given by (3.7).                   Let  λ(ω) = ∑k bk [ω Ek] .  Then, for  i = 1,…,n , 

(3.10)             ∑ωΩ λ(ω) pi(ω) = ∑ωΩ  pi(ω) ∑k bk [ω Ek]  
 
                         = ∑k bk ∑ωΩ  pi(ω) [ω Ek] = ∑k bk pi(Ek) ,

and so by (3.6) and the fact that each of the terms bk pi(Ek)  is positive, λ is a likelihood for (p1,…,pn).  By (2.6) and (2.7) it then follows that (3.8) and (3.9) hold.
       
Sufficiency.  Suppose that T satisfies CJC and that λ is a likelihood for (p1,…,pn).  Let (ω1,ω2,…) be a list of all those  ω Ω  for which        λ(ω) > 0, and let   E = { E1, E2 ,…}, where Ei : = { ωi }.  Setting 
bk : = λ(ωk)/ λ(ω1) for k = 1,2,…, we have each bk > 0 and b1 = 1.




   On a minimalist interpretation of the foregoing, we have simply established the mathematical fact that if we want Jeffrey conditioning to commute with externally Bayesian pooling operators, then the right parameterization of such conditioning is given by (3.5), rather than (3.2). And the heuristic employed in identifying (3.5)  can be seen as a purely formal inference from the fact that the very scenario in which external Bayesianity is formulated dictates that individuals update their priors using identical likelihoods, and that the result of pooling those priors is updated using those same likelihoods. Since identical likelihoods entail identical Bayes factors at the level of atomic events, we need only observe (Theorem 3.1) that for Jeffrey updating, the identity of atomic level Bayes factors is equivalent to the identity of Bayes factors at the level of events in the family E, and we arrive at the doorstep of the parameterization (3.5), and hence of the formulation of CJC that ensures that EB implies CJC. As a bonus, we get the converse implication, and thus a particularly salient characterization of EB in terms of Jeffrey conditioning, a probability revision method with which formal epistemologists are well acquainted.





1.  Many treatments of the problem of combining probability distributions deal with pooling operators defined, slightly more generally, on Δn.  For reasons that will soon be obvious, we are  excluding consideration of cases where there is no state of the world  ω  to which all individuals assign positive probability. This is, however, considerably less stringent than the usual restriction posited in treatments of external Bayesianity, namely, that for all pmfs pi under consideration,  Supp(pi) = Ω.

2.  This is a rather weak unanimity condition. One often sees in the literature a much stronger condition of this type postulated, namely, that for each  c  [0,1],  if  p1(ω) = …= pn(ω) = c,  then       T(p1,…,pn)(ω) = c. It isn’t clear that pooling should be restricted in this way in any of the scenarios (i)-(v).

3.  See Jeffrey [1992a, pp.117-119]. 

4.  Specifically, [‌ω  E] = 1  if  ω  E,  and  0  if  ω  Ec . This notation is a special case of the wonderful notational device introduced by Kenneth Iverson [1962] in his programming language APL, in which propositional functions are denoted simply by enclosing the propositions in question in square brackets. See Knuth [1992] for an elaboration of how this notation simplifies the representation of various restricted sums.

5. As statisticians use the term, any constant multiple of the elementary likelihoods pi(obs|ω) is also called a likelihood function. It is for this reason (and also the fact that in the continuous case, conditional density functions may take values outside [0,1]) that λ is not restricted to taking values in the unit interval. See Evans and Rosenthal [2004, pp. 281-283] for a particularly lucid discussion of the likelihood function.

6. It should be emphasized, however, that if Ω is infinite, there are cases of probability revision that cannot be conceptualized as the result of conditioning on some event obs in an extension of Ω. This observation is the essence of the famous Superconditioning Criterion of Diaconis and Zabell [1982, Theorem 2.1].

7.  The property of external Bayesianity actually applies to pooling operators for any sort of density function. We have described here what this property amounts to in the discrete case. For the full formulation, including a characterization of externally Bayesian pooling operators in the most general setting, see Genest, McConway, and Schervish (1986).

8.  When formula (2.11) involves division by zero, it is to be understood as asserting that  λ(ω*)pi(ω*)qi(ω) = λ(ω)pi(ω)qi(ω*). A similar remark applies to formula (2.12).

9.  Note that  ∑ωΩ Π1≤ i ≤n pi(ω)w(i) is strictly positive since          (p1,…,pn)  Δn+ , and finite since   Π1≤ i ≤n pi(ω)w(i) ≤ ∑1≤ i ≤n w(i)pi(ω)
by the generalized arithmetic-geometric mean inequality. See
Royden (1963, p. 94).

10. In the standard exposition of Jeffrey conditioning (also called probability kinematics) the family E = {Ek} is taken to be a partition of 
Ω, so that, in addition to pairwise disjointness of the events Ek, one has 
Uk Ek = Ω.  Standardly, (ek) is a sequence of nonnegative real numbers summing to one, and it is assumed that zeros are not raised, i.e., that p(Ek) = 0  implies that  ek (= q(Ek)) = 0.  Finally, it is stipulated that
0 x p(A|Ek) = 0 if p(Ek) = 0, so that ek p(A|Ek) is well-defined even if
p(A|Ek) isn’t. Given the standard formulation, our family E simply comprises those Ek in the partition for which ek > 0. Conversely, our format yields the standard one by associating to our family                   E = {E1, E2,…} , if it fails to be a partition, the partition                           E = {E0, E1, E2,…}, where E0 := Ω \ k Ek, and setting  e0 = 0.

11.  Condition (2) is known variously as the rigidity condition or the sufficiency condition.

12.  See Jeffrey [1992, pp. 124-125].

13.  This parameterization of JC is in the spirit of an earlier parameterization, due to Hartry Field (1978). Field’s parameterization only applies, however, to JC originating in a finite family of events.

14.  When p and q are probability measures on a sigma algebra A of subsets of a set Ω of arbitrary cardinality, this parameterization takes the form  q(A) = Σk bk p(AEk) /  Σk bk p(Ek)  for all  A  A.

15.  In particular, it is shown in section 5 of that paper how other measures of probability change, such as ratios or differences between posterior and prior probabilities, fail to meet three criteria that should clearly be satisfied by any representation of new learning.
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